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ASIAN CENTER
198 BROADWAY ROOM 302
NEW YORK, N.Y. 10038

RECENT CONGRESSIONAL MATERIALS ON THE SITUATION IN EAST TIMOR.

[illegible] supply systems.

3. Israeli forces are equipped to maintain, service and repair as needed US origin military equipment including the most sophisticated electronic equipment and aircraft. Israel has a proven capacity for quick turnaround during conflict and the capacity to innovate rapidly in wartime.

4. Israel has an excellent deep water port at Haifa bay, featuring communications and military infrastructure.

5. Nearby Haifa, Israel has excellent air facilities of the most modern type and can service virtually any variety of jet engine or aircraft type.

6. Israel is close to vital sea lanes in the Eastern Mediterranean, Red Sea and Persian Gulf. Her ability to effect a rescue at Entebbe, jam radars in Uganda, maintain in the air a command and control and medivac aircraft, indicate a clear ability to project power over long distances.

7. Israel maintains a domestic air force larger than many fighter forces in Western Europe and possessing more up to date military hardware.

8. Israel is a multilingual country with an in-depth capability to monitor Soviet and Eastern European broadcasts, and to maintain surveillance over hostile states in her immediate region. Most Israel officers read, write and speak English and received training in the United States, Great Britain or France.

9. Israel is experienced in combatting Soviet tactics and is familiar with a wide range of Soviet military methods.

10. Israel is well situated to provide substantial assistance to the US Sixth Fleet when operating in the Eastern Mediterranean. It keeps in its arsenal equipment common to the fleet, including naval models of the US Phantom F-4 aircraft, many types of missiles, and the E2-C early warning aircraft, used widely by the Sixth Fleet.

11. In the case of wide-scale war in which the US may be tied down in southern Europe, Israel can provide essential military support to the US by combatting flanking operations sponsored by the Soviets, by tying down local troublemakers, and by requiring the Soviets to commit forces to preventing an Israeli strike against her port facilities, air bases, and military stations in and around the Mediterranean. Israel can also provide emergency air cover for the Sixth Fleet if needed.

12. Israel is a democratic country with tested anti-Soviet, pro-Western leanings, a high level of internal order and a strong orientation to support the NATO system.●

THE CRISIS IN IRAN—WHERE ARE THE ALLIES?

● Mr. DOLE. Mr. President, 2 days ago I introduced a resolution of support for the President concerning the crisis in Iran. In this resolution the President was urged to take whatever appropriate action deemed necessary, with Congress standing foursquare behind him, to enlist the support of the international community in securing the release of the American hostages. The Senator from Kansas suggested two actions the United States, its friends and allies and, indeed, all the nations of the world who are themselves affected by this criminal act, could take to influence the situation.

First, all nations could close their embassies and withdraw their diplomatic personnel from Iran, recommend that their citizens leave that country, and suspend diplomatic relations until the hostages are released. The seizure of American diplomats on U.S. sovereign [illegible] conduct. If such actions are allowed to go unchallenged the entire network of international procedure and ability to transact diplomatic relations among nations will break down. This would not be the last taking of previously immune hostages.

Second, in order to remove the real club the Ayatollah is holding over all of our heads—the oil weapon—the global community ought to impose a unified, voluntary world embargo on the purchase of Iranian crude oil, until the Government of Iran guarantees that all diplomats and embassies will be given immunity and normal freedom of action.

International standards of conduct have been universally agreed to in the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, signed by Iran, as well as centuries of custom and tradition concerning diplomatic immunity. All nations have a stake in enforcing them, and the United States stands ready to accept the sacrifice a decrease in imported oil may mean, and to aid other countries who participate in the embargo to not suffer unduly from the cutoff.

Now, I see James Reston, writing in the New York Times has championed this same theme. In his editorial "Where Are the Allies" he makes these same points I have raised and goes further to expound on the basic criminality of Khomeini, who speaks as an outlaw, outside the mainstream of both Middle Eastern thought and events. I request that the full text of this article be printed in the RECORD.

The article follows:

WHERE ARE THE ALLIES?

(By James Reston)

WASHINGTON, November 13.—The niceties of normal diplomatic procedure are not working in Teheran because this is not a rational conflict between sovereign states but a hijacking.

Ayatollah Khomeini is as much an outlaw as any other criminal who takes over an airliner with a gun or a bomb, but with this difference: the hijacker usually acts on his own: Khomeini is acting in the name of a nation and a religion to the detriment of both, and placing what's left of diplomacy between nations in jeopardy.

It has been established for generations that an embassy is not only a symbol but a physical part of a nation's sovereign territory. Even in the ugliest phase of the cold war, embassies were respected not only as a safe haven for officials and their families but as a refuge for dissenters.

Much as Moscow hated the Roman Catholic Church and tried to intimidate its priests, it usually respected the sanctity of foreign embassies and had the decency—if that's the right word—or at least the good judgment, not to hound them down behind the gates, since the Soviets wanted diplomatic immunity for their own people.

Khomeini is now defying this tradition, and his new acting foreign minister, who has lived in France for 17 years and should know better, has sent a letter to the Secretary General of the United Nations, Kurt Waldheim, trying to change the question from Iran's violation of the U.N. Charter and the Vienna Convention on diplomatic immunity into an investigation of the Shah. At no point does he even mention the violation of the United States Embassy or the seizure of the hostages.

This is not merely a question between Washington and Teheran. You can argue that [illegible] and the Shah in particular with more foresight, but what we are threatened with now is international anarchy, which is a concern of all civilized nations, and even those that are not so civilized.

But where are the allies? The Western Europeans who yearned for "collective security"? They have said many sensible things at home and at the United Nations. They have praised President Carter for his restraint and urged Ayatollah Khomeini to release the prisoners. No doubt they have expressed some sterner but discreet warnings in private; but this is not really good enough.

President Carter cannot deal with this diplomatic and religious tangle alone. Doubtless it was good politics to announce that the United States wouldn't buy any more Iranian oil (before they refused to sell it to us). But Teheran is probably right in saying that it can make more money by selling its oil on the spot-market in Rotterdam or elsewhere.

Two things are required, or so it seems in this corner:

First, a diplomatic boycott of Iran by the allies until Khomeini releases the hostages and restores normal diplomatic procedure. And if this fails, which it probably would, then a commercial boycott of Iran's exports and imports.

Second, some assertion from the nations of the Moslem world that Khomeini does not speak for their faith. The word "ayatollah" means a "reflection of Allah," but he is now giving Allah a bad name and bringing the principle of moderation—even the whole idea of religion—into disrepute in an increasingly secular world.

There is very little chance of either a diplomatic or commercial boycott of Iran, or of any general protest in the Moslem nations against Khomeini's heretical view of the true faith. The general attitude here and among most politicians is that he is an old fanatic who will be destroyed by the fatal flaw of thinking he is what he merely pretends to represent.

Not that Khomeini has a monopoly on hypocrisy. The allies are condemning Iran but buying its oil. The Communists are demonstrating in the streets of Teheran against the helpless hostages in the American Ambassy, as they demonstrated against the Shah, and just waiting for the inevitable collapse of Khomeini.

And even here at home, we see an odd kind of hypocrisy. Khomeini has managed to do something that has eluded Jimmy Carter. He has been so outrageous that he has brought the American people together against him, but with one important exception: Even Khomeini can't make us save gas.

What we need now is not a lot of people using up more fuel and running around shaking their fists at this bearded old man, but finally some honest conservation to relieve our reliance on overseas supplies.

The answer to the Iranian crisis is a major effort at collective security—at home, in the alliance of the industrial nations, and if possible, with some help from the true spirit of the Moslem world.

Everybody is crying these days to be "free," but as Somerset Maugham once wrote: "If a nation values anything more than freedom, it will lose its freedom; and the irony of it is that if it is comfort or money that it values more, it will lose that too."

TRAGEDY IN TIMOR

Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, few Americans have probably heard of East Timor. A small island in the Indonesian archipelago, it is halfway around the world. And if we were to see pictures of starving men, women and children emerging from this tiny island, most of

us would imagine that they were pictures from Cambodia, not a place called Timor.

But while the world's attention is understandably focused on mass famine in Cambodia, a similar tragedy is unfolding today in East Timor—and for similar reasons.

Over 250,000 people in East Timor—half the total population—now face critical starvation conditions, due to the ravages of a civil war which has raged since the Portuguese literally abandoned their island colony in 1975, with no preparation for self-sufficiency much less independence. This vacuum invited the subsequent invasion by Indonesian forces in an effort to incorporate the island into Indonesia.

A bloody guerrilla war has continued since then, and Timor was sealed from the view of the international community—by Indonesian authorities—very much as the regime of Pol Pot closed Cambodia to outside view. But finally the desperate conditions confronting their peoples could no longer be contained, and the spectre of mass famine could not be kept secret.

After many years of serious charges of human rights violations, Indonesia finally opened East Timor to the view of several international and voluntary agencies, permitting an international response to the escalating human needs on the island. Unlike Cambodia, the United States moved expeditiously to respond to the appeals of the International Committee of the Red Cross and Catholic Relief Services for emergency relief supplies.

In June, the Office of International Disaster Assistance in the Agency for International Development (AID) first provided some $1.3 million in cash and food assistance to the ICRC and Catholic Relief Services. The total now is $2.9 million in cash, plus $4.7 million in Public Law 480 Food-for-Peace commodities—or some $7.6 million combined.

In August an AID team visited East Timor and, along with an official of Catholic Relief Services, surveyed additional needs and reported their findings to our Government as well as to my office. I have closely followed developments in East Timor, and I commend AID for its expeditious action in support of international relief programs.

But if the specter of Biafra and Cambodia is not to be entirely repeated in East Timor, we must move not only to provide food and medicines. We must act as well to give strong diplomatic support to efforts to bring peace as well as relief to the people of Timor.

Mr. President, I ask that the following articles on the crisis in East Timor be printed in the RECORD.

[From the Washington Post, Nov. 15, 1979]

TIMORESE BATTLE FAMINE; RELIEF OFFICIALS COMPARE IT TO BIAFRA, CAMBODIA

(By Paul Zach)

JAKARTA.—The Indonesian province of Timor is battling a famine and outbreak of disease that some relief officials here are calling as bad as Biafra and potentially as serious as Cambodia.

While the plight of Cambodian refugees in Thailand has been drawing most of the attention, officials of the U.S.-based Catholic Relief Services have mounted a virtually unnoticed effort here to distribute 9,000 tons of food to 240,000 people in East Timor.

Volunteers from the International Red Cross and Indonesian Red Cross are rushing aid to another 60,000 villagers, some of whom have been reduced to skeletons loosely draped with skin.

Indonesian authorities are blaming the tragedy developing in Timor on a drought and on the lingering effects of a brutal civil war that followed Indonesia's takeover of the former Portuguese colony in 1976.

[Indonesia has been accused by Timorese exiles and some international human rights groups of fostering the famine through its occupation policy there. Among their charges are that Indonesian troops forcibly take food that was to have gone to the Timorese people.]

"I have been doing this sort of work for 14 years, but East Timor is the worst I have ever seen," said Frank Carlin, the head of the Catholic Relief Services office in Indonesia.

Interviewed while directing operations in East Timor, about 1,500 miles east of Jakarta, Carlin and a handful of coworkers admitted they face a difficult task convincing the world of the need for aid in yet another pocket of suffering in Southeast Asia.

The stricken province comprises the eastern half of Timor island, sliced off from the west by Portugal nearly 400 years ago for use as its coffee plantation. When the Portuguese pulled out in 1974, they left behind a single high school, a native population of 653,000 that was 90 percent illiterate and only 13 miles of roads.

The absence of roads and facilities in the hostile jungles and mountains is hampering relief work. About $1.2 million of the $7.7 million budgeted for East Timor by the Red Cross is going for the charter of helicopters.

The Red Cross and Catholic relief group, with aid mainly from their own coffers, and the governments of the United States, Australia and West Germany, have managed to set some stocks of high-protein biscuits, sugar, dried milk powder, rice, cooking oil, corn soya blend, and some medical supplies to the docks of the province's capital city, Dili.

But transferring the supplies from the docks to the needy has been slowed by overgrown jungle tracks and limited carrying capacity of helicopters. Red Cross delegate Cedric Neukomm said his organization needs an additional $4 million to charter ships and increase the operating hours of helicopters.

Neukomm, a veteran of Red Cross work in critical areas, said he found conditions in East Timor worse than in Lebanon, Biafra or Bangladesh.

"What you have is a situation where people for four years have been on a starvation diet. Obviously, many will die and continue to die. But they still have a chance and a will to live and if we can get the supplies to them in time they will survive," he said.

Rescue workers report that as many as nine people die each day from starvation in the vicinity of the village of Halotia, 50 miles southwest of Dili. Red Cross doctors, who conducted a survey there, discovered 80 percent of the 8,000 villagers had malaria. Farther east, in Laga, doctors estimated malnutrition and disease claim three to five victims each day.

The terrain that has impeded transfer of supplies also has made it impossible for officials to determine the full extent of the problem.

U.S. Embassy officials, who have helped dole out $5.1 million in aid, said they believe the worst is behind them and substantial progress has been made in dealing with about 5,000 critical cases.

Other officials in East Timor said they fear only the fringe areas of suffering have been reached so far and that heavy rains expected in December could cut off supplies and lead to more deaths.

About one-fifth of East Timor's population of about 600,000 is believed to have fled from coastal areas to the mountains during fierce fighting that broke out in 1975 between a pro-communist independence group called Fretilin and a movement favoring merger with Indonesia.

The Indonesian government later launched an all-out invasion to bolster the latter group. After eight months of civil war, President Suharto announced in July 1976 that East Timor had been incorporated as the 27th province of Indonesia, a move still drawing fire from other Third World countries in United Nations debates.

To temper the criticism, Indonesia has allocated $15 million for development in East Timor this year. Thus far, most government contributions have gone for window-dressing like the introduction of color television in Dili.

Bitter battles between Fretilin guerrillas and Indonesians continued after annexation. The violence drove thousands of villagers into the mountains in search of refuge. It was not until Fretilin leader Nicolau Lobato was killed by Indonesian militia in an ambush late last year that the fighting subsided and people began returning from the mountains.

The island's poor soil barely allows subsistence level agriculture for residents in the best weather. But a drought last year wiped out the corn crop and the people took to eating the seeds that were to be used for this year's planting. Thus, there was little food for those returning from the mountains.

[From the New Republic]

ANOTHER CAMBODIA

Next time you see a photo of a gaunt-eyed, swollen-bellied Cambodian child, or read a report about mass death from war, disease, and starvation in Indochina, think about the small Asian island of East Timor. Much the same thing that has happened in Cambodia has happened in East Timor, some 2500 miles to the southeast. Between a tenth and a third of the island's population—60,000 to 200,000 persons—has been killed or has died from lack of food and medicine since fighting started in 1976. Half a generation of Timorese children may have been rendered mentally retarded by malnutrition. Right now 250,000 Timorese are languishing in resettlement camps which one recent visitor, a refugee-relief expert, described as "horrible—as horrible as any I've seen anywhere, including the Thai-Cambodian border." Of these 250,000, about 60,000 face starvation unless relief supplies reach them within the next two months, and 25,000 are in critical condition at this very moment.

For Americans, there is a big difference between Timor and Cambodia. We do not have the luxury, in the case of Timor, of blaming what's happened on Khmer Rouge fanatics or the communist government of North Vietnam. The agony of East Timor is the result of a bloody and brutal territorial seizure by America's friend, Indonesia, and we are deeply implicated in what has happened. Indonesia's original invasion, in December 1975, occurred just 12 hours after President Ford and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger had visited Jakarta, Indonesia's capital, raising no public objection to the impending attack. American weapons were used in the initial assault and throughout Indonesia's four-year campaign to suppress nationalist guerrillas. The Ford administration accepted Indonesia's claim to East Timor, and so did the Carter administration, which (despite its stated policy of limiting world arms transfers) increased military sales to Indonesia from the Ford level of three million dollars to $112 million in 1978.

Despite consistent reports by Australian and other sources about Indonesian atrocities in East Timor, and despite occasional congressional hearings on events there, the

Carter administration has raised scarcely a public peep over human rights violations on the island. The US doesn't want unfortunate goings-on in an obscure place to frustrate better relations with the world's fifth most populous country, a resources-rich anti-communist ally strategically placed in the gap between the Asian mainland and Australia and between the Pacific and Indian Oceans. Indonesia, in effect, has extorted the United States into silence by making it clear it would allow no Western humanitarian relief agencies to visit and help Timor if too much were said about what's going on there. Even now, Carter administration officials are afraid to say too much, lest Indonesia refuse to cooperate in saving those who face starvation between now and the monsoon season.

The conscience of America will be eased to know that the US government, having supplied the weapons of Timor's destruction, is now providing 8119 tons of a high-protein rice and corn soy blend to feed its refugees, and has furnished $2.9 million in aid to the International Red Cross and Catholic Relief Services, the agencies responsible for helping Timor's population. However, the conscience of America should not rest too easy. American officials raise some doubt whether enough transportation facilities exist on the island to get food and medicine to all who need it before the rains start. An American researcher who has done extensive work on Timor, Arnold Kohen, also cites church and government sources in Australia, Indonesia, and the US as charging that Indonesian military authorities have systematically plundered previous relief shipments and parceled out the remainder on a politically discriminatory basis. The conscience of America really should not rest at least until the US government has done all it can to assure that the people it has made miserable really are helped.

It is not terribly surprising that America has paid little attention to Timor up to now. It is located nowhere—at the far southern end of the Malay archipelago, 350 miles north of Australia. The whole island is about double the size of New Jersey, and for 400 years it has been divided culturally and politically into eastern and western parts. West Timor was a Dutch colony, with a large Moslem population, and naturally joined Indonesia (which is predominantly Moslem) when the rest of the country won its independence. East Timor, however was Portuguese and heavily Catholic. It was not at all necessary or natural that it would join Indonesia when the Portuguese withdrew in 1975. A brief, bloody civil war was fought in September of that year between left- and right-wing factions committed to independence. The left-wing faction, Fretilin, won out, using arms provided or taken from the former Portuguese garrison.

Indonesia was willing to tolerate a Portuguese East Timor, but not an independent mini-state. The right-wing government of President Suharto has asserted that Fretilin was a communist movement, but US officials say there is no evidence whatever to support the claim. Probably Indonesia figured it had nothing to gain by tolerating an independent neighbor. The Indonesians first sent in commando units from West Timor, which seized border areas in September 1975 and (according to Australian intelligence sources) killed five Australian television reporters who filmed the invasion.

In late November Fretilin declared independence and on December 3 it appealed to President Ford to prevent Indonesia from invading. During Ford's visit to Jakarta, Kissinger issued a public statement saying that the United States understands Indonesia's position on the question" of Timor. Whatever American officials may have said in private about what Indonesia was about to do, it certainly had no deterrent effect. On December 7 Indonesia launched a full-scale invasion against the East Timor capital of Dili. A high-ranking Indonesian general confirmed to a US congressional delegation that "of course there were US weapons used. These are the only weapons that we have."

There is virtually no dispute that the initial invasion was accompanied by widespread, indiscriminate killings of civilians by Indonesian troops. As in Vietnam, and as in Indonesia's own civil war, ethnic Chinese seem to have been a special target of systematic brutality and murder. US State Department officials admit excesses during the early days of fighting, but claim offending soldiers and commanders were removed and disciplined. Critics of US policy assert, however, that the top commander of the forces attacking Dili was not disciplined at all, but was decorated and promoted to brigadier general.

It is an interesting parallel between Cambodia and East Timor—and one which may not be coincidental—that the Indonesian government, like Pol Pot's regime in Cambodia, made it almost impossible for the outside world to know what it was doing as it attempted to assert control over the land. Prior to its invasion, Indonesia warned Australia to get all its nationals out of the country, and also demanded the departure of International Red Cross workers. As in Cambodia, foreign visits were permitted only rarely, and then were tightly controlled.

Because of the secrecy, it's impossible to know exactly what transpired in Timor from 1975 until this year, when a few Westerners again began to travel around the country as part of relief efforts. Indonesia justified its secrecy, and its activities, as an "internal matter" after May 1976, when an Indonesian-appointed "Regional Popular Assembly" unanimously voted to ask for incorporation of Timor into Indonesia. This action has been declared invalid three times by the United Nations General Assembly. The Carter administration's official human rights report declared diplomatically that the US "has accepted the incorporation of East Timor into Indonesia, but it does not recognize that a valid act of self-determination occurred." Recognition of the incorporation, however, saves the US from having to object to its ally's use of US-supplied equipment to commit aggression.

On the ground in East Timor, it's clear that after Indonesia's invasion, Fretilin's forces fled the island's small urban centers for the rugged highlands. The insurgents may have numbered as many as 25,000 persons. In 1976, the Indonesian military began to make use of Rockwell OV-10 "Bronco" counter-insurgency aircraft—slow-moving planes equipped with infrared detectors, bombs, rockets, napalm, and machine guns, specifically designed for close combat support against an enemy without an effective antiaircraft capability. US congressional committees have been told by critics of American policy that Indonesia used the planes not only to destroy guerrilla strongpoints, but also to wreck the villages and crops of highland dwellers in order to separate them from Fretilin.

Estimates of casualties in Timor vary greatly. In 1976, a leader of a provisional government created by Indonesia said he believed 60,000 persons had been killed. In March 1977, James Dunn, an Australian parliament researcher and former consul in Timor who is the most energetic gatherer of information about the island's travail, told a US congressional committee that 100,000 persons had been killed. He based his estimate on reports from Indonesian church officials and refugees. At the same congressional hearing, US State Department officials said such high reports were "greatly exaggerated." One official said that the death toll was probably 10,000. This year, James Dunn compared pre-war Portuguese census figures with current Indonesian military estimates of the population and found that 300,000 persons are "missing." Kohen, citing church sources, says more than 200,000 have died. One US State Department official said last week that 100,000 is the "generally accepted figure" on Timorese deaths. Another said he knew of no accepted figure. What American intelligence agencies know from Australian monitoring of Indonesian military communications, U.S. officials will not say.

The most intense fighting in Timor has occurred during the Carter administration's tenure in office—and so have most of the casualties. In mid-1977, Indonesia offered an amnesty to Fretilin, but also moved 10,000 fresh troops into the country and stepped up counter-insurgency operations. In the fall, a French photo-journalist slipped into the country and later claimed that the Indonesian army was "systematically wiping out" villages suspected of supporting the guerrillas. In 1978, employing search-and-destroy techniques, heavy air bombardments, and helicopter-borne attacks, the Indonesians began to make decisive headway against Fretilin. On the last day of the year, an Indonesian force killed the opposition's president, Nicolau Lobato.

The level of continuing resistance in Timor is in dispute. Indonesian authorities seem confident enough now to allow some Westerners to make helicopter visits around the countryside more or less freely as they inspect refugee camps. However other sources, including Arnold Kohen, contend that the resistance is still alive. Kohen asserts, citing reports from U.S. government officials and church sources, that the Indonesian military's policy is to execute summarily all Fretilin members, supporters, and their families, leaving resistance fighters little choice but to hide when they are unable to fight. Although the U.S. government recognizes Indonesia's take-over of Timor, it's still not clear that Timor has acquiesced.

During 1978 and 1979, a massive stream of Timorese refugees—some 300,00—has descended from the interior highlands to coastal areas and towns, driven by a combination of war devastation and drought to seek food, medicine, and shelter. The condition of the refugees has been described by witnesses as being worse than in Biafra, the Sahel, or Bangladesh during their respective disasters. In September 1978, church relief workers told visiting correspondents that 500 people per month were dying in one East Timor district alone. Other recent visitors say a third of the refugees are marasmic—emaciated, bellies swollen from malnutrition—or post-marasmic, in a state where their bodies are consuming their own protein. Of 250,000 now in refugee camps, one experienced relief official said he guessed 25,000 "are not going to make it" in spite of international relief efforts. The scale may be smaller, but Timor is another Cambodia—and it is partly our responsibility.

WINDFALL PROFITS TAX—UNANSWERED QUESTIONS

● Mr. GARN. Mr. President, on October 30 I wrote to Secretary William Miller, Secretary Charles Duncan, Jr., Secretary Harold Brown, and Mr. Stuart Eizenstat asking questions on the effect of the windfall profits tax on refiners and integrated producers. As of this date I have not received a reply to my questions from any of them.

We are about to start debate on the windfall profits tax and I am disappointed that I have not had the courtesy

HUMAN RIGHTS IN EAST TIMOR

HON. TOM HARKIN
OF IOWA
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Wednesday, April 16, 1980

● Mr. HARKIN. Mr. Speaker, I have submitted today a sense of Congress resolution expressing concern about conditions in East Timor and calling upon the President to take certain actions with respect to the situation there. The resolution—a bipartisan effort—has 55 cosponsors. I would like to take this opportunity to discuss conditions in East Timor and describe the resolution we have proposed.

East Timor is half an island in the Indonesian archipelago which was a Portuguese colony until 1975. When the Portuguese left and rival East Timorese groups began competing for power, the Indonesian military invaded the island and sealed it off from all contact with the outside world. Relief organizations, journalists, church groups, and other foreigners were thrown out of East Timor, and a blanket of silence thrown over Indonesian activities in the area for the next 5 years.

Last year, news reports began trickling out of Indonesia that hundreds of thousands of East Timorese who had fled to the mountains to escape the Indonesian military were now drifting down into Indonesian-controlled areas. The appalling physical condition of these people is evidence that the Indonesian military's extensive bombing of villages, hamlets, and cropland had the effect of pacifying the population and forcing the sick and starving refugees into Indonesian military camps. Estimates of the number of deaths from war, disease, and starvation vary from one-tenth—the Government of Indonesia's claim—to one-half—estimates by church and human rights groups—of the approximately 700,000 East Timorese recorded in a 1974 church census. By any calculation, however, the Indonesian military incursion has clearly devastated East Timor.

Representatives from the U.S. Government visited these camps with relief personnel in September of 1979 and reported horrifying conditions there. One aid official called the disease and famine the worst he had ever seen—including the Thai-Cambodian border. The International Red Cross—which had been petitioning the Government of Indonesia unsuccessfully since the invasion to provide aid in East Timor—at last began their feeding and medical programs the following month. The United States supplied $1.8 million to the International Red Cross in medicine and food supplies, and $10,016,062 to the Catholic Relief Service, which includes $5 million in Public Law 480 commodities.

Today, 7 months after the programs began, the situation in East Timor is improving. Recent cables from the U.S. Embassy in Jakarta indicate that the health and nutrition of the approximately 300,000 East Timorese who have been reached by the Catholic Relief Service and the International Red Cross is vastly improved.

It is clear, however, that continued food and medical assistance is needed, particularly in the south central and eastern portions of the territory. Accordingly to recent reports from East Timorese church officials, there are many needy areas that the aid organizations have not reached, and hunger and disease continue to be a problem in East Timor. Additionally, the ICRC and CRS hope to stimulate agricultural initiatives in all areas of the territory because without a good maintenance program, the health and nutritional levels could slip back to the critical situation of last year.

In addition to the valuable food and medical assistance relief organizations provide in East Timor, it is clear that the presence of the ICRC, in particular, contributes to more humane administration by the Indonesian military. The following is a quotation from a March 8 cable from the U.S. mission in Geneva which the Department of State made available to me:

(ICRC official Mr. Convers) said that the presence of the ICRC delegates in East Timor had an ancillary benefit in providing a measure of security against possible reprisals and arbitrary acts of violence by the Indonesian security forces. ICRC fully recognizes the importance of its continuing role as the principal agency with outside, non-Indonesian personnel regularly functioning in East Timor. Although their operational program is focused on relief assistance, the Swiss ICRC delegates are also well aware of the function they serve in observing the human rights situation.

It is precisely because of the ICRC's role in monitoring and restraining Indonesian military excesses and human rights abuses in East Timor that the numbers of non-Indonesian personnel should be increased. Currently there are three Swiss relief personnel in East Timor. The Congress should encourage the Government of Indonesia to allow more ICRC personnel, as well as representatives from the United Nations and other organizations into the area to monitor ongoing military operations there.

I am particularly concerned about the problems of the East Timorese who want to leave the island. A March 8 report filed in the Portugese newspaper Expresso based on interviews with dozens of refugees from East Timor describes the bribes that must be paid to Indonesian military officials in order to leave East Timor. It is clear that the Government of Indonesia has a highly selective and discriminatory emigration policy. The ethnic Chinese in East Timor who could afford to pay the bribes have been allowed to leave, but thousands of full-blooded East Timorese have not only been prohibited from emigration, but subjected to repression and abuse as well.

My colleagues and I have sponsored the following resolution because we believe a strong gesture of congressional concern is needed about the continued presence of Indonesian troops in East Timor, the restriction of international aid personnel, the restrictions on East Timorese emigration, and continuing human rights violations on the island. We believe that the current situation in East Timor demands special attention from the President, and would urge him to take the actions described in the proposed congressional resolution.

In conclusion, I would like to make available to my colleagues in the Congress a report from the London Sunday Observer, Sunday, March 23, which highlights some of the continuing problems in East Timor:

H. Res. —

A resolution expressing the sense of the House of Representatives that the President should take certain actions with respect to East Timor

Whereas an estimated 100,000 East Timorese have died from starvation, disease, and fighting resulting from the invasion and occupation of East Timor by the Government of Indonesia;

Whereas an estimated 400,000 East Timorese have been displaced from their homes;

Whereas the majority of the East Timorese people have suffered from malnutrition and hunger;

Whereas the Government of Indonesia refuses to permit the free emigration of East Timorese people;

Whereas the Government of Indonesia has not allowed free access to East Timor by the United Nations, relief agencies, humanitarian organizations, journalists, or church groups;

Whereas the United Nations, the Interparliamentary Union, and the Conference of Non-Aligned Nations have repeatedly condemned the Government of Indonesia for its invasion and unilateral annexation of East Timor; and

Whereas the people of East Timor have not been permitted to freely exercise their right of political self-determination: Now, therefore, be it

Resolved, That the House of Representatives calls upon the President to immediately—

(1) increase humanitarian assistance to East Timor by providing to East Timor through non-governmental organizations more food, commodities, medical supplies, and funds;

(2) encourage the Government of Indonesia to allow the free emigration of those East Timorese wishing to leave the country and to allow international relief personnel and journalists free access to East Timor;

(3) establish a United States presence in East Timor to monitor the distribution of relief aid and the emigration of East Timorese; and

(4) encourage the Government of Indonesia to withdraw its troops from East Timor and to allow an internationally supervised election in which the East Timorese can freely exercise their right of self-determination.

[From the London Observer, Mar. 23, 1980]

"SLAVE" ISLANDERS STRUGGLE TO SURVIVE

(By Brian Eads, Jakarta, Indonesia)

Malnutrition and disease are still more widespread in East Timor than in ravaged Cambodia, but the people are slowly struggling back to life.

The picture emerges from conversations with knowledgeable sources in the Indonesian capital, four years after Jakarta's troops annexed the tiny former Portuguese colony by brute force and proclaimed it the nation's twenty-seventh province.

My application to visit the territory was rejected by the so-called G-Division, the armed forces intelligence bureau that wields supreme authority over East Timor.

'Indonesia is a big place,' I was told by a grinning colonel, 'why don't you go somewhere else?'

It seems Indonesia is distressed that foreign visitors dwell on the past, rather than looking towards the rosy future mapped out in a glossy government brochure entitled 'East Timor to build a better tomorrow.'

By all accounts, the past is still likely to thump you in the eye, and if you are an Indonesian in uniform, it's liable to shoot at you.

In an effort to blunt international criticism of their actions in East Timor, Jakarta is allowing two relief agencies to care for the 300,000 people, more than half the population, who fled their homes and were reduced to starvation after the Indonesian invasion.

Progress has been made. 'They're not dying like they were when we arrived five months ago,' said one relief worker. The observation is relative. People continue to die from intestinal diseases and malaria complicated by acute malnutrition and vitamin deficiency.

Neither the Catholic Relief Service nor the International Red Cross teams are allowed sufficient access to make meaningful assessments of how far their emergency aid has cut death rates.

Perhaps the most telling observation came last week, from an official who'd recently visited Cambodia. He said that medically the East Timorese are in a worse state than the Khmers.

Indonesia recently rejected an offer from the United Nations Children's Fund to add its weight to the relief effort. Relief officials are confident that the Catholic service and the Red Cross at least will be allowed to continue their work when the initial agreement, giving them six months' access, expires next month.

BROKEN SPIRIT

After this the fate of East Timor is anyone's guess, and glossy brochures and promises aside, the indications do not bode well.

The hungry and malnourished 300,000 came down from the hills towards the end of 1978 when three years of Indonesian military attrition had broken the back and the spirit of their resistance.

They are now confined to 'resettlement villages,' each with its squad of Indonesian troops.

Relief officials hope that maize already planted near the villages will provide enough to feed the people for five months this year, but there are doubts about whether the disruption of the people's semi-nomadic, tribal life-style will enable them to feed themselves in the future.

The only evidence of Indonesian development plans are the 'resettlement villages,' and the schools staffed by teachers shipped in from Indonesia, with the officially stated aim of 'washing their brains' of Fretilin's nationalist ideology.

Visitors say the relationship between Indonesians and East Timorese is like that between master and slave, and that there is little prospect of renewed resistance from a severely traumatised population.

I was told that in the capital, Dili, educated East Timorese are confined in at least one, and perhaps more, 'concentration camps.'

Australia and the US now oppose UN resolutions affirming the right of the East Timorese people to self-determination. Britain, for its part, abstains, but will shortly deliver eight BAC Hawk ground attack/trainer aircraft to the Indonesian armed forces.

The considerations which prompted Indonesia to gobble up East Timor, and won the tacit support of the West remain—unimpeded passage through her waters for warships of the US Pacific Fleet, the possibility of offshore oil, and the need to discourage separatist inclinations in Indonesia's outer islands.

'Looking at it now,' said a source in Jakarta, 'I see that East Timor never had a hope. They're just too small to stand up for themselves and no one is prepared to stand up for them.'

The death toll since the Indonesian invasion is put at somewhere between 60,000 and 100,000.

The joyless prospect for East Timor is that it will become just another impoverished backwater in Jakarta's far flung empire.●

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June 26, 1980

Dear Colleague:

Last winter many of you or your staffs met with several young refugees and Catholic priests from the former Portugese colony of East Timor, who came to Washington to discuss some of the problems facing their beleaguered country.

A prime concern of the East Timorese we met with is family reunification. Since late 1976, few people have been allowed to leave East Timor without paying enormous illegal bribes to Indonesian officials. Needless to say, most East Timorese are in no position to do this. The refugees with whom we met all have close relatives who have been prevented from leaving East Timor to join them in Portugal.

Furthermore, since their visit to Washington, the refugees have received no communications from their families remaining in East Timor. The identities of the young Timorese refugees who were in Washington are known to the Indonesian authorities; and the refugees fear that their families may be suffering reprisals or harassment.

Because of our concern for these particular individuals and the family reunification question in general, we are sending the enclosed letter to the Indonesian Ambassador in Washington.

If you would like to demonstrate your concern by joining us, please contact Holly Burkhalter with Rep. Harkin at 5-3806 as soon as possible.

Thank you for your consideration.

Sincerely,

Tom Harkin
Member of Congress

Max Baucus
Senator

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TOM HARKIN
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June 26, 1980

His Excellency D. Ashari
Ambassador
Embassy of Indonesia
2020 Massachusetts Avenue NW
Washington, DC 20036

Dear Ambassador Ashari:

We would like to express our concern over the situation of East Timorese who wish to be reunited with their families in Portugal and Australia, as well as others who wish to leave East Timor. We are particularly concerned about the families of individuals with whom we are personally acquainted. A list of names and addresses of their families is attached; all have voiced their desire to join their relatives in Portugal.

We recognize that the Government of Indonesia is aware of these humanitarian problems and would like to see a just solution no less than we do. Nonetheless, we understand that problems on the local level have resulted in extremely long delays.

It has been made known to us that if the Government of Indonesia will allow these people to leave, the Government of Portugal would welcome them, and that members of their families or humanitarian agencies would assist with transportation costs.

We hope that you can lend your assistance in facilitating the reunification of families in Portugal and Australia and, importantly, the speedy departure for Portugal of those individuals and families named here. These are family members of East Timorese refugees who visited with members of Congress and officials in the Executive branch last February.

Thank you for your consideration and assistance.

Sincerely,

Tom Harkin
Member of Congress

Max Baucus
Senator

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Subcommittee SBA and SBIC Authority and General Small Business Problems
Subcommittee on Antitrust Restraint of Trade Activities Affecting Small Business
Foreign Affairs
Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs
Subcommittee on International Organizations

FACTS ON SEC. 406 -- "REPORT ON EAST TIMOR"

* This section was approved unanimously by the Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs and complements the findings of the Wolff Congressional Delegation trip.

* Sec. 406 simply requests the Administration to report to Congress on the actions it has taken to encourage the Indonesian Government to allow increased access to East Timor by international relief organizations and to permit them to establish relief operations directly on East Timor. It also seeks to encourage the Indonesians to allow free emigration from East Timor, particularly in the case of families whose members already have left while others remain behind. Finally, it encourages the Indonesians to allow access to East Timor by international journalists.

* The section seeks to elicit information -- not make accusations. There have been numerous allegations raised both before the Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs and in the media about problems with the relief effort in East Timor. The purpose of this sense of Congress resolution and the report requirement is to get more of the facts about what is occurring in East Timor and what the United States should be doing. Conflicting reports about East Timor should be resolved.

* *

REPORT ON EAST TIMOR

Asia Subcommittee

SEC. 406. (a) It is the sense of the Congress that the President should take all appropriate measures to—

(1) encourage the Government of Indonesia to allow increased access to East Timor by international relief agencies and to allow the establishment in East Timor of humanitarian relief operations by such international agencies;

* (From the testimony of Prof. Ben Anderson of Cornell before the Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs and the Subcommittee on International Organizations):
"International relief supplies have also been manipulated and embezzled by the local Indonesian military. In some cases, the distribution of relief has been made contingent on 'loyalty,' and even on the performance of intelligence functions for the army. In other cases, clothing, medicine, and other vital commodities have ended up, not with the refugees, but on the local black market.
"It is important to emphasize that even now the ICRC, barred from East Timor from the time of the December 1975 invasion through the spring of 1979, has still been permitted only three foreign personnel -- one doctor, one nurse, and one administrator -- though it is supposed to deliver effectively almost $2,000,000 in aid to tens of thousands of East Timorese. It has to work through the Indonesian Red Cross, whose officials, even when dedicated, are subject to severe political controls by the military. Catholic Relief Services, in effect a subcontractor for U.S. AID, has not even been allowed to station one foreigner on a regular basis in East Timor."

* (From the March 6, 1980 Christian Science Monitor article "U.S. role in plight of Timor: an issue that won't go away"):

"At any rate, at one point last year, more than 200,000 people, or two-fifths of the population of East Timor, were said by experts to be suffering from malnutrition."

* (From the Jan. 29, 1980 New York Times article "Refugees From East Timor Report Famine Situation"):
"Ranking Indonesian officers have organized a system, using soldiers as middlemen, to divert Indonesian, Red Cross and other humanitarian relief, chiefly rice, to shops in Dili."

* (From the Jan. 15, 1980 Christian Science Monitor article "Is Timor Aid Being Stolen?"):
"According to Timorese refugees just arriving here (in Portugal), the Indonesian authorities are embezzling part of the international aid currently being channeled to starvation-struck East Timor."

(2) encourage the Government of Indonesia to allow free emigration from East Timor, particularly in the case of families some members of which have previously left East Timor; and

* (From the March 6, 1980 Christian Science Monitor article "U.S. role in plight of Timor: an issue that won't go away"):
"The Indonesian government claims to have created no obstacles to the departure of Timorese who want to join family members living in Australia and Portugal. But Australian and Portuguese diplomats contend that the Indonesians are reluctant to let many Timorese leave the island for fear that they might publicize what has happened there."

* (From the testimony of Prof. Ben Anderson of Cornell before the Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs and the Subcommittee on International Organizations):
"Inhabitants of East Timor have been forcibly prevented from leaving. Virtually no native Timorese have been allowed to escape; the same is largely true of Portuguese citizens. Only a small cluster of Chinese have managed to get out, at the cost of paying what, in the East Timor context, are enormous bribes to Indonesian officials."

(3) encourage the Government of Indonesia to allow access to East Timor by international journalists.

* (From the Jan. 29, 1980 New York Times article "Refugees From East Timor Report Famine Situation"):
"When important outsiders, particularly foreign journalists, visited Dili, the refugees said, the Indonesians removed tanks and other military vehicles from the town, naval vessels were withdrawn from sight and soldiers and policemen went into the streets in plainclothes, pretending to be Timorese and warning people against talking to the visitors. 'When journalists go there they are never free,' a man recounted, adding, in reference to to the Indonesian President: 'And people are forced to shout "Viva Suharto!" There are many police in mufti watching, and if people say anything else, they are dealt with later.'"

* (From the testimony of Prof. Ben Anderson of Cornell before the Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs and the Subcommittee on International Organizations):
"Since the Indonesian occupation began, foreign correspondents have been systematically excluded from East Timor; on the rare occasions when some have been let in they have been prevented from making free contacts with the population. The only American correspondent of note to have visited East Timor recently, Mr. Henry Kamm of the New York Times, notes that for two whole years his requests for permission to visit were denied. . ."

* (From the March 6, 1980 Christian Science Monitor article "U.S. role in plight of Timor: an issue that won't go away"):
"Access to East Timor by the news media remains limited."

(b) The President is requested to report to the Congress, not more than six months after the date of the enactment of this Act, with respect to the actions taken to carry out subsection (a) of this section.